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Exporting form West Bengal: A Trader’s Nightmare1 
Sanjib Pohit 
NCAER, 11 Indraprastha Estate 
New Delhi 110 002 
Email: spohit@ncaer.org 
Abstract 
The share of exports from West Bengal in India’s overall export is about 6 percent. The present objective of the 
West Bengal government is to increase it to more than 10%. To meet this objective, obviously efforts are needed 
on many fronts. The diversification of exports basket, identification of new products, identifying new markets, 
improving packaging facilities within the states, developing special economic zones, etc are some of the means 
that the state of West Bengal seem to emphasise in her policy directions. However, one thing that does not seem 
to figure in the policy framework of West Bengal’s government is to increase facility for the expansion of 
exports to Bangladesh/Nepal. This is despite the fact that large and vibrant informal trade between India-
Bangladesh or India-Nepal continues to thrive in these three countries and the borders of West Bengal are the 
major routes for these kind of operation. Since the origin of the goods of most of this trade is West Bengal, a 
logical step should be to bring this informal trade into formal channel as a first step towards increasing the 
state’s share of exports. It has been argued here that this kind of trade persist due to a host of factors such as, 
complex customs procedures, capacity constraints and/or corruption at the border. Given the fact it is easier to  
exports to Bangladesh than any other South Asian countries/Europe due to not-so-strict standard, the focus area 
of exports of West Bengal, it makes sense to create the right environment for exporting to Bangladesh/Nepal. In 
this context, this paper attempts to analyse the shortcoming of trade facilitation measures in India-Bangladesh 
border.  
 
                                                          
1 Dr. Sanjib Pohit is a Chief Economist (Senior Fellow) at NCAER. These are my personal views. 
 1. Introduction 
Since independence, most of India’s states have been passive towards exports originating 
within the state’s border.   By contrast, they have been pro-active towards industries located within 
the state, and catering towards the domestic economy.  Expectedly, they have the fiscal power to tax 
the industries catering towards the domestic economy. As a result, the states’ have been by and large 
pro-active in addressing the grievances of the domestic industries.  Somehow, the general impression 
that one observes from the behaviour of the states and the central government is that it is the latter’s 
headache.  
Though the state receives a share of the overall revenue collection from import/export 
activities as per directives of finance commission, given the uncertainties of the behaviours of the 
other states, it is quite rational in this kind of non-co-operative game for an individual state 
government to be less pro-active towards exports originating from the state. Moreover, if a state is 
also a transportation hub for trade with Nepal/Bangladesh, which is the case with West Bengal, the 
benefits from these kinds of activities in terms of employment/income generation do not somehow 
become transparent to the policy-makers in the state. This is a real puzzle since we can see in other 
parts of world (Dubai, Singapore, Colombo), what a transportation hub can do for the economy. 
While it may be argued that Dubai’s growth is partly due to the oil exports, the same is not true of 
Singapore, or Colombo.     To a certain extent, it seems odd that policy-makers in India as well as 
abroad consider India to be an upcoming economic super-power, yet India needs to tranship her sea 
going export/imports either at Dubai, Colombo, or Singapore.  Understandably, the transhipments are 
not cost-less, hence India’s exporters trading in bulk items though sea have to bear with this extra cost 
while entering into business deal.  
Of course, India’s air-bounds exports are in a better place in comparison to the above. 
However, the problem again is there that our trading partners have changed faster in recent times than 
the trading routes leading to extra cost due to transhipment.  Moreover, this is a more problem for the 
countries of the Eastern India, like for example West Bengal. By and large, USA, Europe, Middle-east 
countries have been the major destination for India’s exports and Bombay/Delhi have gained as the 
transportation hub for air-cargo from India. With time, India’s exports to South Asian countries have 
increased. Though Kolkata happens to be closer to the South Asian countries, in terms of trading 
routes, Mumbai/Delhi offers traders more flexibility in term of wider choices of routes/carriers/flights. 
Thus, it seems that policy–makers in West Bengal need to be more pro-active in addressing these 
problems of the exporters. A business strategy in collaboration with other Eastern states, incentives 
for the exporters from other Eastern states have give the exporters the extra push to shift their cargo 
from Dehli/Mumbai to Kolkata airport leading to the development of new cargo routes for exporters. 
It is clear from the above discussion that there are structural bottlenecks that the exporters 
from West Bengal have to bear with. Understandably, some of the bottlenecks need more time to be 
solved and the policy-makers may work towards solving it. However, the issues that can be sorted out 
in short period of times should be addressed at first to give the right signal to the exporters/investors 
that the government means business. Among these, of course, the export to Bangladesh from West 
Bengal is the foremost one. The present paper highlight the transporter’s/exporter’s nightmare in the 
context of exports to Bangladesh and how this has ultimately lead to “ persistent open smuggling” in 
which all the stake-holders (police, government officials, BSF, traders, political parties, mafias, etc) 
have a role to play. 
 
2. Bottlenecks of India-Bangladesh Border 
 The focus of our discussion would be on the LCS between West Bengal (India) and the 
corresponding ones in Bangladesh. Since most of the official trade is conducted through the LCS of 
West Bengal (India), it is expected that the condition of the LCS would be better than the LCS 
engaged in small volume of trade. However, this is not so as we see below.  
 
2. 1. DESCRIPTION OF BORDER CROSSING LOGISTICS2 
Three LCSs in West Bengal, namely Petrapole, Mahadipur and Hilli are the most important 
gateways for trade with Bangladesh in terms of trade volume and value. For our understanding, Table 
1 provides a summary picture of the physical infrastructure at these LCSs. As this table shows, 
parking lots in all the LCSs lack the basic amenities like drinking water and toilet. The approach roads 
to the LCSs are congested. The frequent power cuts coupled with low voltage at the LCSs adversely 
affect the efficiency of customs officials. Surprisingly, there is no government-bonded warehouse in 
these LCSs. Thefts from parking lots are common and corruption is rampant. Since the problems 
prevailing in the three LCSs are similar in nature, we have chosen Petrapole border for our in-depth 
study as it handles the highest trade (66% in value terms during 2001-2002) between India and 
Bangladesh.  
Petrapole is located about 95 kilometres from Kolkata. The commodities that are traded 
through Petrapole LCS originate from all over India. Kolkata is the final transhipment area for most of 
these commodities and they are carried to the Petrapole border by trucks through the National 
Highway 35, formerly known as Jessore Road as it originates from Jessore in Bangladesh. The delay 
in this route is a normal phenomenon due to the heavy traffic, three railway crossings and five 
congested towns (Barasat, Dutta Pukur, Ashoknagar, Habra and Bongaon) en route, poor physical 
condition and narrow width of the road, and encroachments.3 Another major hurdle in transportation 
is the narrow Naobhasa Bridge, which is located 3 kilometres prior to Petrapole. The bridge is so 
                                                          
2 The finding of this section is drawn from Das  and Pohit (2004). 
narrow that at a time only one truck can pass. Moreover, heavy trucks with carrying capacity of 15 to 
18 tonnes or more cannot pass through this bridge due to its poor condition. This results in 
transhipment either in Kolkata or Bongaon incurring additional transportation cost and time.  
 
Table 1: Bottlenecks in Physical Infrastructure and Procedural Hazards 
Facility Hilli Mahadipur Petrapole 
Approach 
Road to LCS 
• Single lane congested road 
 
• Poor physical 
condition  
 
• Passes through congested 
towns & places infested by 
hawkers. 
Parking lot • No sanitation facility and 
inadequate drinking facility. 
• Not secured -  loss through 
theft 
• Prevalence of speed money 
 





• Not secured -  loss 
through theft 
• Prevalence of 
speed money 
• No sanitation facility and 
inadequate drinking water 
facility. 
• Not secured -  loss through 
theft 




• No government bonded 
warehousing 
• No government 
bonded 
warehousing 
• No government bonded 
warehousing 
Others • Poor quality of power 
• Local clubs with political 
affiliations extort exporters 
for donations 
• Hilli not notified in Duty 
Entitlement Pass Book 
(DEPB) port registration – 
traders of DEPB items not 
getting the benefit. 




• Absence of  bank 
collection centre 
• No office space for 
clearing & 
forwarding agents  
• Irregular power supply 
with low voltage  
• Single gate for export, 
import  and passengers 
• Frequent strikes delay 
official work  
• Electronic Data 
Interchange (EDI) 
ineffective due to lack of 
efficient operator 
 
   
Merchandise has to face substantial loss of time at the border. The delay takes place at the 
parking lot, in customs clearance and at the entry/exit point. It is mandatory for the trucks coming 
from Kolkata during daytime to park at Bongaon Municipality Parking instead of moving directly 
towards the Central Warehousing Corporation (CWC) parking lot which is situated near the border 
gate and adjacent to the Indian Customs House. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
3 The width of Jessore road is only 16 feet. 
The existing custom clearance procedures at the border lead to significant costs and delays. 
The existing custom procedures and documentation are not transparent. As a result, all the exporters 
employ clearing agents on a commission basis to take up the responsibilities of all paper works at the 
border.  Although, there is no official fees for paper work at customs office, exporters have to bear for 
overtime allowances of custom staffs if they want their consignment to be cleared on holidays or 
before/after the scheduled working hours. Recently, the government of India introduced the Electronic 
Data Information (EDI) system at custom office at Petrapole for streamlining the system. However, 
the system did not have smooth operation and so the manual clearing of papers is still the norm.  
The entry point at the border has one single gate, which is used for exports, imports as well as 
for passenger movement. At a time, only one truck can pass through the gate. As a result, the entry 
point remains very congested. Big trees at the entry-exit point often become irritants to traffic flow. 
The Indian trucks after unloading at Benapole (in Bangladesh) are allowed to enter India only after 7 
PM. or are allowed to return to India before the start of exports from India (i.e. 10 AM). This results 
in wastage of time together with payment of detention charges. 
 
2. 2. QUANTIFYING COST-BORDER DELAY  
A trader/exporter incurs transaction costs in all the phases of the export process starting from 
obtaining information about market conditions in any given foreign market and ending with receipt of 
final payment. In a recent pape by Das and Pohit (2006), an attempt was made too quantify these costs 
on the basis of information collated through field survey of exporters/transporters engaged in India-
Bangladesh trade.4 For clarity, the entire activities related to exports through the Petrapole-Benapole 
border have been divided into the following three distinct phases:    
• Phase 1 - loading at Kolkata, unloading at Benapole in Bangladesh and crossing of border while 
returning from Bangladesh  
• Phase 2 - transportation and  
• Phase 3 - exports including parking, customs clearance and crossing of border during exports.  
The information on transaction costs needs further clarifications. In our analysis, the 
transaction costs that are quantified are only those incurred by Indian exporters up to the point at 
which they leave their cargoes in Bangladesh. Transaction costs beyond this point in Bangladesh are 
not quantified, so the total transaction costs of India-Bangladesh trade are not quantified. To be 
specific, the present paper solely deals with the total additional transaction costs incurred by the 
                                                          
4 In all, the estimates were based on 88 exporters and 25 transporters. 
Indian exporters. Even in quantifying the additional transaction costs of the Indian exporters, certain 
transaction costs are not picked up in the survey.5 
Table 2 indicates that the aggregate delay (loss of time) pertaining to all the three phases of 
exports turns out to be around 99 hours on an average (approximately 4 days) for a single shipment.  
The data suggests that the aggregate delay could be as high as 192 hours (8 days). 
 
Table 2: Cumulative Loss of Time in Exports 
Stages Ideal time 
(hrs) 




Phase 1- Loading at Kolkata, unloading at Benapole in Bangladesh 
and crossing of border while returning from Bangladesh 
5.9 17.8  91 
Phase 2- Transportation 2.4 3.2  5 
Phase 3- Exports including parking, customs clearance and crossing 
of border during exports 
21.3 78.1  96 
Cumulative 29.6 99.1  192 
 
2. 3. TRANSACTION COST VIS-À-VIS SHIPMENT VALUE 
We have attempted to quantify the extent of this additional transaction cost in relation to the 
average value of shipment based on the perceptions of our sample exporters. By and large, exporters 
were found to be trading in multiple commodities. So the response of an individual exporter in the 
questionnaire regarding the transaction cost vis-à-vis shipment value pertains to an average figure 
taking into account all the commodities that he is engaged in trading. Thus our analysis fails to 
identify commodity specific results in this respect. The results are given in Table 3.   
 
  Table 3: Transaction Cost Vis-à-vis Shipment Value 
Cost Elements % of Shipment Value 
Average Maximum 
Delay in customs clearance including Transport, parking and 




Total bribes  2.50 (0.74) 10 
Delay in obtaining export remittances 2.15 (1.33) 12 
Total 10.38  
Note: Figures in the parenthesis indicate the coefficient of variation. 
 
                                                          
5 For example, theft in the border parking lots which presumably leads to increased insurance costs and the costs 
involved in pre‐shipment inspection are not covered in this paper. 
As this table shows, the average financial implication of the loss of time in customs clearance 
and transportation including parking and queue at border turns out to be 5.73 per cent of value of 
shipment. The survey results indicate that the maximum perceived loss is 18 per cent.  Similarly, the 
financial implications of bribes and delay in obtaining export remittances are 2.50 per cent and 2.15 
per cent of the shipment value respectively (Table 3). The results of the survey reveal that majority of 
the exporters pay bribe which varies between 1 and 3 per cent of the shipment value; the maximum 
being 10 per cent. The maximum perceived loss due to delay in obtaining export remittances is 12 per 
cent of the shipment value. 
Thus, it may be concluded that on an average an Indian exporter incurs in sum an additional 
transaction cost of about 10 per cent of the shipment value.      
 
3. Informalisation of Trade 
Despite liberalisation in tariff/quota between India and Bangladesh under Uruguay Round and 
successive rounds of South Asian Preferential/Free Trading Arrangements (SAPTA/SAFTA, recent 
works (Chaudhari, 1995; Taneja, 1999, Pohit and Taneja,, 2003) indicate that India’s informal trade 
with Bangladesh continues to thrive and shows no sign of decline. If there are factors other than trade 
and domestic policy barriers that determine informal trade, then a deeper understanding is essential. 
There could be several institutional and non-economic factors that influence informal trade.  It may be 
possible that an efficient institutional arrangement exists, which supports informal trade. It is also 
possible that the informal channel has a better payments mechanism or a good marketing distribution 
network.  These factors would attract traders to the informal channel. 
By contrast, if the infrastructure supporting formal trade is weak and costs of trading increase 
substantially with higher volumes, some of it may spill over into informal trading. In particular, the 
official machinery through which formal traders have to operate may be very cumbersome causing 
delays and thereby escalation in costs.  Moreover, the rent-seeking activities of the public servants at 
each step of transactions may dissuade traders from using the official channel. Furthermore, a 
distinctive feature of the South Asian countries is the inadequate transit and transport systems (see 
Taneja, 1999, Pohit & Taneja, 2003). This often results in high transport costs in the region and 
creates a strong incentive for trade to take place through informal channels.  
To understand the mechanism and functioning of informal trading markets, a survey was 
conducted during 1999. Bangladesh has a long and porous border with India covering three of her 
states, namely West Bengal, Assam, and Tripura. However Chaudhari (1995) reported that nearly 
95% of illegal exports to Bangladesh goes from West Bengal. Consequently, sample of traders were 
drawn from the border districts of West Bengal in India and from the border regions of Khulna and 
Rajsahi divisions of Bangladesh, which span the border districts of West Bengal. Given the time and 
cost consideration, 200 traders consisting of 100 traders each in the formal and informal channel, split 
equally between the two countries, were covered.   
The traditional argument is that informal trade takes place due to trade and domestic policy 
distortions. As and when such distortions are corrected informal trade would shift to the formal 
channel. However, our survey revealed that institutional factors were the most important factors 
encouraging informal trade between India and Bangladesh. The top four factors (viz, quick realization 
of payments, no paper work, no procedural delays and lower transportation costs) in Bangladesh or 
India are found to be factors giving rise to transaction costs (see Table 4). The inadequate transport 
systems that have been in existence between India and Bangladesh have led to high transportation 
costs. With respect to transit modalities, the survey has identified following bottlenecks: port 
congestion, excessive documentation, delays, slow movement of goods, transhipment and other 
indirect costs. While in India ethnic ties ranked fifth in importance, the presence of high duties in the 
official channel ranked fifth in Bangladesh.  
Table 4  Reasons for Informal Trade  (Percent of respondents) 
  Factors Influencing Informal trade Bangladesh India 
Presence of high duties in official channel 50 18 
Quantitative restrictions 34 22 
Leakage of administered price goods 12 14 
Absence/shortage of storage/warehousing facilities 24 6 
Produced locally across border 40 22 
Presence of haats/bazaar 22 20 
Lower transportation cost 72 50 
Lower time to reach destination for perishable commodities 36 42 
Lower time to reach destination for non-perishable commodities 28 30 
Absence of trading routes 0 10 
No procedural delays 52 82 
No paperwork 76 92 
Quick realisation of payments 88 94 
Lower bribes 26 38 
Nexus between enforcement agencies and traders 46 30 
Ethnic ties 24 42 
Note:  Respondents had the option of ticking more than one factor. 
 
 
Since perceptions on factors influencing informal trade were sought from Bangladeshi as well 
as Indian traders, a  Spearman's rank correlation was computed for the ranking of factors given by 
both kinds of respondents. It shows a high value of 0.77 indicating converging of views regarding the 
factors influencing informal trade. Formal traders in Bangladesh and India were also asked to give 
their perceptions on the factors that they considered important for informal trade. A Spearman's rank 
correlation for perception of factors between formal and informal traders in Bangladesh yields a high 
value of 0.75.  The same for the Indian traders yields a value of 0.76.  Thus, there is high degree of 
agreement among the traders regarding the relative importance of various factors. 
As noted above, institutional factors dominate among the reasons put forward by the traders 
for existence of vibrant informal trade. Now any kind of institutional factors give rise to transaction 
cost. Of course, transaction cost also exists in the case of informal trade. Naturally, the question arises 
whether informal trade flourishes because of lower transaction cost in informal trading than in formal 
trading. In this context the survey instrument was used to arrive at the transactions costs that traders 
incur in the two channels.6 The sign-rank test suggests that transaction cost in formal in India as well 
as in Bangladesh is significantly higher than the informal counterpart (see Table 5). 
 
Table  5. Results of Wilcoxon's Signed-ranked test 
       Parameter       Bangladesh Territory Indian Territory 
 Z statistics Inference Z statistics Inference 
Transaction Cost (TC) 4.84 Fo>If* 3.27 Fo>If  
*Fo pertains to formal, If pertains to informal. The tests have been carried out at 5 % level of significance. 
 
4. Summary and Policy Recommendation 
This paper attempts to stress the importance of trade facilitation measures at the India-
Bangladesh border for efficient movement of goods through the LCSs. We have also made an attempt 
here to quantify the cost implications of the informal trade barriers that impinge upon trade between 
the two countries through the land border. It has also been argued that lack of efficient system has led 
to the growth of informal trade between the two countries.  
The primary survey reveals that the transaction costs in the informal channel are significantly 
lower than the formal channel in both the countries. This aspect was further highlighted when 
informal traders were asked about why they opted for the informal channel.  The survey revealed that 
                                                          
6 Transaction costs for informal traders include payments made to enforcement agencies, transportation costs, 
cost of credit and cost of currency exchange. For formal traders transaction costs include bribes paid at various 
stages to officials, transportation costs including insurance and cost of credit. 
factors like quick realisation of payments, no paper work, and no procedural delays were instrumental 
in driving the traders towards informal channel.  
 One aspect that is usually not taken into account while undertaking trade liberalisation, either 
unilaterally or through free trade agreements (FTAs), is the welfare implications of the existing 
institutional barriers. In low income and transitional economies including India and Bangladesh, 
currently the real barrier to trade is quite often institutional taking the form of unreasonable customs 
delay accompanied by widespread demands for bribes to expedite the movements of goods. In this 
kind of regime, perishable commodities are obviously more adversely affected by delays than non-
perishables. Tariff reductions have little or no impact on domestic prices due to the capacity constraint 
in processing imports. More queuing results in added real resource costs, rather than generating 
revenues, as is true with tariffs. Perishability considerations affect the costs of liberalisation through 
more product loss. However, the literature on trade liberalisation or cost and benefits of FTAs has 
rarely touched on this issue. The precise length of these delays and how they arise is, unfortunately, 
poorly documented, but their impact on trade is undeniable.  
Our estimation shows that the total delay (loss of time) in exporting a single shipment from 
India to Bangladesh is to the tune of four days (99 hours). Our analysis also shows that on an average 
an Indian exporter incurs in sum an auxiliary transaction cost of about 10 per cent of the shipment 
value; the maximum delay occurs in custom clearance including transport, parking and queue at 
border. 
The approach roads towards the LCSs have to be widened. A Government bonded 
warehousing facility is mandatory in all the LCSs to promote an efficient system of handling 
exportables. Efforts should also be made to operationalise the EDI system round the year. Local 
administration with co-operation from exporters should take the responsibility to ensure supply of 
drinking water and proper sanitation facilities at the parking lots. In addition, the concerted effort by 
local administration and exporters should sort out the issues related to poor quality of power supply 
and strikes.  
At present, West Bengal is the largest transportation hub within India for trade with 
Nepal/Bangladesh and Bhutan. The facilities have however not coped with the pace of growth of trade 
with these countries leading to “open smuggling” at the border area, with law-and-order ramifications. 
The direct and indirect employment generation from these activities, viz. being the transportation hub, 
are large and as such warrants attention from the government for creating atmosphere for the growth 
of these kind of activities.  If one consider also the livelihood of people who are associated with the 
smuggling activities due to the shortcoming of the formal channel, it seems logical that the state 
government needs to address the grievances of transporters/exporters in the context of India-
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